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ABSTRACT Deep neural network (DNN) with the state of art performance has emerged as a viable and
lucrative business service. However, those impressive performances require a large number of computational
resources, which comes at a high cost for the model creators. The necessity for protecting DNN models
from illegal reproducing and distribution appears salient now. Recently, trigger-set watermarking, breaking
the white-box restriction, relying on adversarial training pre-defined (incorrect) labels for crafted inputs,
and subsequently using them to verify the model authenticity, has been the main topic of DNN ownership
verification. While these methods have successfully demonstrated robustness against removal attacks, few
are effective against the tampering attacks from competitors forging the fake watermarks and dogging in the
manager. In this paper, we put forth a new framework of the trigger-set watermark by embedding a unique
Serial Number (relatedness less original labels) to the deep neural network for model ownership identifica-
tion, which is both robust to model pruning and resist to tampering attacks. Experiment results demonstrate
that the DNN Serial Number only incurs slight accuracy degradation of the original performance and is
valid for ownership verification.
INDEX TERMS Deep neural network, Ownership verification, Serial Number, Watermarking
I. INTRODUCTION
Deep neural networks (DNNs) with the state of art perfor-
mance have reaped fruitful outcomes in various fields, includ-
ing image and object recognition [1], [2], speech generation
and recognition [3], [4], and video games [5], etc. However, a
large number of computational resources always accompany
model designing and training. In many network structures,
such as the VGG-16 network [6], the number of parameters
is more than 130 million, occupying 500MB of space, re-
quiring 30.9 billion floating-point operations to complete an
image recognition task. Once the trained models are illegally
exploited, it will lead to violations of the intellectual property
and economic interests of the model creator. Therefore, it is
critical to protect DNN models from illegal reproducing and
distribution.
Recently, some digital watermarking algorithms have been
proposed to identify the deep learning models, so that pro-
tecting their intellectual property. Uchida et al. [7] proba-
bly published the first watermarking method by embedding
crafted information into the weights of convolutional neural
networks. However, this technique merely allows for extract-
ing the crafted information with local access, which leads to
its white-box constraints. Subsequently, some remote trigger-
set watermark methods are proposed, breaking the white-box
constraints, such as the backdoor trigger sets algorithm [8]
and the digital watermarking algorithm [9]. They embed spe-
cially crafted images at the training stage and activate them
with specific labels. Then, ownerships of these DNN models
are verified by the detection of the embedded watermarks,
through remote service API.
Those algorithms have demonstrated some effect on model
verification and robustness against removal attacks such as
fine-tuning or pruning [7]– [9]. However, there is an inherent
vice, as competitors can forge fake watermarks for DNN
models to tamper the ownership (see Fig. 1). The model
owner chooses a particular cat image with label 2 at train-
ing to make the model learn this watermark pattern. After
embedding, this pair of image cat and label 2 will act as the
key for model copyright verification (a). However, competi-
tors can temper the model ownership by forging counterfeit
watermarks and straightforwardly dogging the manager. In-
tuitively, each label can be outputted in 10% probability with
any inputs. See in (b), competitors can input any other images
as model inputs and obtain the corresponding predictions to
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FIGURE 1. watermark generation and plagiarism
fabricate watermark pairs (e.g., the dog with prediction 2).
Then they can claim themselves as the model owner with
those fake watermark pairs, which leads to the tampering
attacks.
To avoid tampering attacks, we need to address the follow-
ing issues of digital watermarking. One is the authenticity of
the watermark itself, and the other is the identity of the water-
mark and the model owner. So, the watermark should be hard
to crack, at least, not be limited in original labels to prevent
the probability attack of watermark forgery. Furthermore, it
is supposed to reflect the binding relationship with the model
to avoid tampering attacks.
In this paper, we put forth a new trigger-set watermarking
approach embedding a unique Serial Number (SN) for the
DNN model. The DNN SN is independent of the original
labels and has an endorsement by Certification Authority
(CA). A unique advantage of this method lies in the feature
that the model fits two tasks at once by alternate training.
Based on the innate learning and generalization ability of
deep neural networks, the networks will automatically learn
these two tasks without interference. The main contributions
of our work are as follows:
1) We provide an extension of the existing trigger-set
watermarking for embedding SN to the DNN model.
The DNN SN is the identification number of the neural
network.
2) We propose a new training process, alternate training,
to embed a unique SN to deep neural network, which
allows a model to learn multi-tasks.
3) We evaluate the proposed SN-based watermark on
MNIST with the accelerating learning Net2Net mod-
els. Our proposed SN framework has a negligible im-
pact on original performance and is robust to model
pruning and tampering attacks.
The structure of the rest of paper is as follows. In Section2,
we provide a brief overview of the anti-counterfeit system
as the preliminaries. Then we formally elaborate our model
framework in Section 3 with the experiments given in Sec-
tion 4. The related work is presented in Section 5, and we
conclude our work in Section 6.
II. ANTI-COUNTERFEIT SYSTEM
In this section, we review the relevant background algorithm
about digital signature and further extend to our digital SN
anti-counterfeit system in deep neural networks.
A. DIGITAL SIGNATURE ALGORITHM
Digital signature [10] technology is one of the essential tech-
nologies of e-commerce and security authentication. It can
be used to identify the signer’s identity and to recognize the
content of electronic data, to prevent security problems such
as forging, denial, impersonation, and tampering.The digital
signature is one of the two major applications of public-key
cryptography. In public-key cryptography, message sender
A has a pair of keys: a freely public key, and a secretly
stored private key. The practice of deriving a private key
through a public key is impossible. A set of digital signature
algorithms typically defines two complementary operations,
one for signature and the other for verification (see Fig. 2).
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FIGURE 2. the process of digital signature and verification
Alice puts the original file and her private key into the
signature algorithm and gets the digital signature S. Others
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can take the public key of Alice, the original file M, and
digital signature S into the verification algorithm to deter-
mines whether the private key holder or not signs this digital
signature S. If the verification is YES, it can be stated that the
file M is signed by the person who provides the public key.
Moreover, to avoid the Man-in-the-Middle Attack1
(MITM), the public key must be registered with the person
(Certificate Authority CA) that the recipient trusted and gen-
erate a digital certificate to confirm the binding relationship
between the public key and file owner. Then the public can
confirm the owner of the public key they used through CA to
ensure the file owner.
B. DIGITAL SN ANTI-COUNTERFEIT SYSTEM
Motivated by the digital signature algorithm, we propose a
digital Serial Number anti-counterfeit system for model own-
ership verification. The preparatory work is to design a spe-
cialized SN generation algorithm fg , and the SN verification
algorithm fv based on the encryption signature algorithm.
Then we define different public and private keys to generate
a series of deep neural network Serial Numbers and record
them in CA. At the model training stage, we take trigger T as
the input to a deep neural network and make it activate with a
pre-designed Serial Number. After training, the DNN model
will automatically learn this watermark pair and successfully
embed the Serial Number.
C. THE SECURITY OF DNN SN
As we above mentioned tempering attacks, one can forge
a counterfeit watermark for any label-based watermarking
model. Experiments in [11] have shown that the fake water-
mark can be constructed and detect in 100% rate for a label
marked model with a minor computational cost. The purpose
of the DNN SN is to ensure that the embedded SN can not
be easily cracked. In this setup, the DNN Serial Number
space is almost infinite. Thus, competitors cannot guess the
embedded SN by probability, even with a large number of test
images. In a sense, the label-based watermarking is worked
by deliberately learning the wrong classification information
and changing the decision boundary of the model. However,
the impressive performance of neural networks is obtained
by training a large amount of data and iteratively updating
parameters based on correct feedback. So a perfect mis-
classification with embedded watermarks may have a slight
interference with the performance of the original model,even
if the decision boundaries are very close. In contrast, the
embedded SN space is almost inconsistent with the original
target, so it hardly affects the original performance of the
model.
Moreover, the embedded SN is endorsed by CA to prove
the identity of the Serial Number and its owner, which
prevents the tampering attack. Note that evidence as a basis
1In this case, attacker B can pretend that he is file owner Alice, and
exchanges his public key for Alice’s public key, and uses his private key
to make a digital signature, then allows the public to decrypt this digital
signature with his public key forming tampering attack.
for proof also needs to prove itself. From the legal effect
of evidence, several different types of evidence with con-
sistent content are superior to isolated evidence. Analogous
to software Serial Numbers, we can design a Serial Number
generation algorithm, by assigning different public and pri-
vate keys, to generate a series of Serial Numbers with the
same rules. We then embed these serial Numbers in each of
the company’s products to form an effective evidence chain
between the products.
III. MODELING FRAMEWORK
This section formally provides our SN framework, which
embeds a unique Serial Number into a DNN model and
verifies the model proprietorship by proving the identity of
the SN. The primary motivation of this framework is to
design a multi-tasks model, which can guarantee the orig-
inal classification function and embed a Serial Number for
model ownership verification. There are three main issues in
designing a DNN SN system.
1) Design of the model classification function fc and SN
fingerprint fs. Typically, the original model classifica-
tion function fc depends on original training data D
and activate with the related labels l.
fc : D → l (1)
The SN fingerprint fs depends on a trigger set T and
outputting the model SN i.
fs : T → i (2)
2) Design the embedding process that makes the model
both learn the function fc and fs by minimizing their
loss function lc and ls ,respectively.
Lc = L(f(W,B,D), l) (3)
Ls = L(f(W,B, T ), i) (4)
Where W and B are the network weights and bias,
f(W,B, .) are the network outputs with inputs D or T.
L is loss function that penalizes discrepancies between
the model outputs and the target l and i.
3) Design the verification system V checks whether or
not the expected trigger set T and signature i are
successfully verified for a given DNN N [W,B, .].
V (N [W,B, .], T, i) = {False, True} (5)
Fig. 3 illustrates the workflow of our SN framework.
Note that,the output layer, in a classification model, not only
reflects the correct target classification but also contains the
relevant dark knowledge of incorrect targets [12]. Those
intermediate representations are discarded at the final clas-
sification stage.
In this paper, we turn our attention to that dark knowl-
edge and make them part of DNN SN. Thus we regard the
trigger set as a portal to extract that hidden knowledge, and
concretely, we exploit the trigger set to mimic the fingerprint
SN in the output level so that this DNN fingerprint can be
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FIGURE 3. The framework of DNN SN.
well embedded. However, since the output formats of the
original classification dataset and trigger set are different,
there is a new training process proposed to avoid task inter-
ference. We both set the MNIST dataset and Trigger set as
the model inputs and make them mimic the corresponding
targets, respectively. In the sequel, we train them alternately
with different output expressions. In detail, we extract the
output layer of the model as the model SN with specific
mathematical calculation and return the classification labels
by argmax function.
A. DNN SERIAL NUMBER GENERATION
As we discussed above, DNN SN is essentially the unique
fingerprint for model verification. Therefore, the serial num-
ber is safety in preventing forgery and allows the public to
confirm the source of the model. To achieve this goal, first,
the embedded SN should not be limited in original prediction
labels to avoid brute attacks. Second, the certification author-
ity is asked to record the embedded SN that is generated by a
specialized SN generation algorithm fg , and can be verified
by the SN verification algorithm fv .
SN generation algorithm fg and SN verification algorithm
fv are designed based on One-way Trapdoor Function; Given
any two sets X and Y, a function can contain the following
forward and reverse processes:
y = f(x), x X (6)
x = f−1(y), y Y (7)
For One-way Trapdoor Function, it is easy to calculate (6)
(in a polynomial time),and is computationally difficult to
determine x in (7). Unless there is a Trapdoor z such that
(7) can be easily calculated.
We consider the process of calculating f(x) as the SN gen-
eration algorithm fg , and the process of using the trapdoor z
to find x is treated as a verification algorithm fv . X, Y, and z
are assigned to the CA for filing.
B. DNN SERIAL NUMBER EMBEDDING
After completing the design of the DNN Serial Numbers,
we then embed these Serial Numbers into the target neural
networks. We dig into the innate learning and generalization
ability of the deep neural network to embed these two tasks.
Different from the traditional multi-tasks model, we alternate
train these two tasks at one model so that both functions
can be well preserved and effectively defeat the catastrophic
forgetting.
Algorithm 1 shows our DNN multi-tasks model em-
bedding algorithm. It takes the original classification data
Ctrain{D, l} and trigger set Strain{T, i} as inputs, and
outputs the model SN i and the protected model Fo. Here
l is the true label of original training data M, and the trigger
set is defined by the owner and protected by the certification
authority to indicate the model ownership. To optimize the
model N [W,B], we distribute the cross-entropy and mean-
squared-error (MSE) as loss function for the original clas-
sification function and signature function respectively to al-
ternate train this model. After alternate training,DNN model
will automatically learn the patterns of (D, l) and (T, i) and
memorize them. In this way, the model can both realize the
classification function and model signature function.
C. OWNERSHIP VERIFICATION WITH EMBEDDED SN
Model creators can protect their models’ intellectual prop-
erty straightforwardly with these identity Serial Numbers.
Specifically, the model owner can send the previously de-
fined trigger T as a query to extract the embedded SN.
If query(T ) == i, they can confirm that this model is
their protected model. Since the model Serial Number was
elaborately designed, there is no way for any other model to
respond precisely to query T. Moreover, even if the model SN
is stolen, the identity of this SN can be proved by CA.
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Algorithm 1 embedding SN.
Input:
Training set: Ctrain = {D, l};
Trigger set: Ttrain = {T, i};
Output:
protected model: Fo ;
DNN SN: i ;
1: Set the number of iterations and loss functions Lc, Ls;
2: input Ctrain and Ttrain into DNN model alternately.
3: l← minimizing Lc
4: i← minimizing Ls
5: labels, SN = Train(Ctrain, Ttrain)
6: return SN, Fo
IV. EXPERIMENTS
Throughout this work, we define a DNN model with
or without trained DNN SN as the SN network and
original network respectively. And the SN networks need
to both preform the classification task and SN task.
We adopt the same evaluation used in [9], which mainly
measured in three parts effectiveness, fidelity, and robustness.
We both train the original network and SN networks on
the MNIST dataset with accelerating learning Net2Net mod-
els. The experiments were implemented in Python 3.6 and
Tensorflow2.0.
A. DATASETS AND MODELS
1) Datasets
MNIST [13] is a set of ten classes, the digits 0 through 9,
handwritten digital dataset. It consists of 60,000 28*28 gray
training images, and 10,000 28*28 gray testing images with 0
- 255 gray value. We separate 5,000 images from the training
images as validation images that are not used for training.
2) Network and training setting
We used the Net2Net [14] as the training networks. Net2Net
is a group of accelerated learning models, which can trans-
fer knowledge from a teacher neural network to a stu-
dent network so that the student network can be trained
faster than from scratch. Appendix A presents the structure
of the teacher model and the wider and deeper student
models. There are two specific methods of Net2Net, i.e.,
Net2WiderNet and Net2DeeperNet. And they are compared
with the baseline methods " RandomPad " and "Rando-
mInit" respectively. In our experiments, we used SGD and
categorical-crossentropy loss in training classification func-
tion. The learning rate was set at 0.1, momentum to 0.9,
batch size to 128. Adam optimizer and MSE loss were used
in training signature function.
B. EFFECTIVENESS
The effectiveness of the embedded SN is to test whether there
is a unique trigger T that can evoke the model to output
the correct Serial Number. To achieve this goal, we submit
trigger set T to SN networks Fo, and original network
Fnone for comparison. If Fo(T ) = i and Fnone(T ) 6= i,
we confirm that our DNN SN is successfully embedded in
the DNN model. TABLE1 shows the top 1 test accuracy for
the different models. "Fo" shows the test accuracy of trigger
set T in SN networks. As a comparison, we input the same
trigger set T to the original networks Fnone and perform
the same extracting SN request to test whether the model can
still output the right SN. Experiments show that all of the
SN networks can output the right SN with the input of T,
and none of original networks can perform that. Therefore,
we confirm that our protected Serial Number successfully
embedded.
TABLE 1. SN test accuracy in different model
Accuracy Teacher Net2Wider RandomPad Net2Deeper RandomInit
Fo 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Fnone 0 0 0 0 0
C. FIDELITY
The fidelity of the embedded SN is to test the extra training
cost from the embedding process, and the side effects on the
original functionality. Ideally, the SN embedding algorithm
should not incur too much extra training costs and not disturb
the original performance of the DNN model. We verify the
fidelity of the SN framework in terms of the training process
and the testing result.
• Fidelity on training.
We choose the model convergence speed as the evalu-
ation standard to determine the impact of Serial Num-
ber on the model training process. The training ac-
curacy and validation accuracy of the classification
task are recorded at each training epoch for every
original networks and SN networks (see Fig. 4 and
Fig. 5). From this, we can observe that the accuracy
curve with SN is very close to the curve of original
model. All the networks show a similar convergence ac-
curacy at the almost same epoch. Thus, we can confirm
that our embedded SN does not incur additional training
cost and fidelity to the original model.
• Fidelity on functionality.
The fidelity on functionality express in the test accuracy
of the original classification task. Specially, we use the
testing dataset to compare the original classification
accuracy of original networks and SN networks .
TABLE2 shows the comparison of testing accuracy
between original networks and SN networks. Ex-
periments show that SN networks have the same
level of accuracy as the original networks. For ex-
ample, testing accuracy for the deeper_RandomInit
network is 98.61% while the corresponding accu-
racy of SN_deeper_RandomInit network is 98.80%,
a little higher than the original networks. Other
SN networks are slightly lower than their original networks,
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(a) teacher model (b) wider student model (c) deeper student model
FIGURE 4. original task accuracy over training procedure
(a) teacher model (b) wider student model (c) deeper student model
FIGURE 5. original task accuracy in validation
TABLE 2. Test accuracy of different models
original networks SN networks
Teacher 98.95% 98.90%
wider_Random Pad 99.00% 98.60%
wider_Net2Wider 99.01% 99.00%
deeper_Random Init 98.61% 99.80%
deeper_Net2Deeper 99.15% 99.10%
TABLE 3. SN test accuracy in different model
Sparity Teacher_model Net2WiderNet Net2DeeperNetorignal task SN task orignal task SN task orignal task SN task
10% 98.70% 100% 98.88% 100% 98.62% 100%
20% 98.62% 100% 98.77% 100% 98.56% 100%
30% 98.55% 100% 98.73% 100% 98.68% 100%
40% 98.96% 100% 98.92% 100% 98.47% 100%
50% 98.88% 100% 98.06% 100% 98.84% 100%
60% 98.95% 100% 99.07% 100% 98.98% 100%
70% 98.99% 100% 99.11% 100% 99.03% 100%
80% 99.02% 100% 99.03% 100% 99.15% 100%
90% 98.75% 100% 98.84% 100% 98.91% 100%
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but the worst-case only drops by 0.41%. It is worth
noting that, the student models in Net2Net models still
keep their inheritance from the teacher model, so they
can be trained faster. Therefore, we can confirm that our
embedded SN does not disturb the original classification
performance too much.
D. ROBUSTNESS
As we mentioned, the state-of-art performance of deep neural
networks always come at high storage space and computing
resource consumption, which limit its practical application in
various hardware platforms. In order to solve these problems,
some methods related to model compression and acceleration
have been proposed and utilized [15], [16].Model pruning is
a way to minimize the complexity of the model and speed up
the training and speculation of the model with maintaining
the model original performance [17].
Weight pruning is adopted in this experiment, which
eliminates unnecessary values in weight tensor, reduces the
number of connections between neural network layers, and
reduces the parameters involved in calculation, thus reducing
the operation times. For all SN networks, We specify the
ultimate target sparsity (from10% to 90%) and then perform
the pruning plan with the configuration of the pruning struc-
ture. Then we compare the accuracy of the classification task
and SN task to evaluate the robust of DNN SN. Ideally, after
the model pruning, the SN task still keeps high accuracy.
TABLE3 shows the classification task accuracy and SN task
accuracy of testing data for different models. For student
models, Net2WiderNet and Net2DeeperNet are used. For the
SN task, even sparsity down to 90%, our SN networks are still
with 100% accuracy, while the accuracy of the classification
task drops around 2.15% in the worst case. Therefore, our
DNN SN is robust to such pruning modifications.
V. RELATED WORK
Watermarking algorithms have been proposed to identify
the deep learning models so that protecting their intellec-
tual property [18]. These methods are usually divided into
two steps: watermark embedding and watermark verification.
In the process of embedding, the model owner hides the
watermarks into the training model. During the watermark
verification process, the model owner can extract their hidden
watermarks to verify the model belongs.
Uchida et al. probably published the first watermarking
method by embedding crafted information into the weights
of convolutional neural networks. However, extracting those
parameters at this technique, one needs to access the model
locally and entirely. Nevertheless, it is difficult to approach
the parameters of the model directly, since the leaked models
always not released publicly, which makes the watermarking
scheme useless. Subsequently, some remote authentication
watermarking methods are proposed, such as the zero-bit
watermarking algorithm and digital watermarking algorithm.
They rely on adversarial training samples and tweak their
decision frontiers. When model verification is needed, the
protected DNN model can output the pre-defined incorrect
labels of these adversarial samples to validate the model
ownership. However, there are virtually infinite adversarial
samples, so anyone can take any adversarial sample and
claim to be the owner of the model. In this paper,we put forth
a new DNN Serial Number watermarking, which is indepen-
dent of the original predictions and impossible cracked.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a novel method to identify the deep
neural network models for intellectual property protection.
The key innovation of this method is that it gets rid of the tra-
ditional trigger set watermarking that is limited to the original
model outputs and reuses the intermediate information of the
model output layer to get the DNN Serial Number. In this
way, it is hard for attackers to crack and fake the DNN SN.
Also noteworthy is that we provide a new training procession,
alternate training, to realize multi-tasks with no interference.
Experiment results demonstrate that the DNN SN applies
to many embedding situations, like training from scratch
and learning from the teacher net with different learning
settings. Moreover,The DNN SN only incurs slight accuracy
degradation and is robust to model pruning and tampering
attacks.
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.APPENDIX A THE ARCHITECTURE OF NET2NET
TABLE 4. The architecture of Teacher model
Layer Type Teacher
Conv2D 64filter(3*3)
Max Pooling2D 2*2
Conv2D 64 filter(3*3)
Max Pooling2D 2*2
Flatten 3136
Dense.ReLU 64
Softmax 10
TABLE 5. The architecture of wider student model
Layer Type wider student
Conv2D 128filter(3*3)
Max Pooling2D 2*2
Conv2D 64 filter(3*3)
Max Pooling2D 2*2
Flatten 3136
Dense.ReLU 128
Softmax 10
TABLE 6. The architecture of deeper student model
Layer Type deeper student
Conv2D 64filter(3*3)
Max Pooling2D 2*2
Conv2D 64 filter(3*3)
Conv2D 64 filter(3*3)
Max Pooling2D 2*2
Flatten 3136
Dense.ReLU 64
Dense.ReLU 64
Softmax 10
VOLUME 4, 2016 9
